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SECTION 3E1.1 OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
BARGAINING WITH THE GUILTY
A defendant who is charged with criminal activity has a series of deci-
sions to make regarding his defense strategy.1 The defendant's strategy is
often influenced by the strength of the government's case2 and may in-
clude plea bargaining before trial in the hope that he will receive a
shorter sentence.3 When entering plea agreement negotiations, the de-
fendant's objective changes from receiving a full acquittal to obtaining
the shortest possible sentence.4 By pleading guilty in exchange for a sen-
tence reduction, the defendant limits the risks associated with a trial in
favor of the certainty of a lesser penalty.5 If a defendant chooses to go to
trial, he may receive a harsher, sentence than that offered in the plea
agreement.6 This is so because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines limit
sentence reductions at the time of trial, whereas the prosecutor has the
ability before trial to reduce the defendant's sentence by dropping
charges.7
1. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that once a
defendant is charged, he is presented with a variety of options, one of which is to enter plea
negotiations).
2. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 170 (1991). In most districts, a public defender may not have
access to the United States Attorney's offices' files. Id. at 169. These files would assist the
public defender in determining the strength of the government's case. Id.
3. See id. at 170. A defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea is often based on his
belief that he will be rewarded with a lesser sentence, or, in the alternative, that the gov-
ernment will, if he chooses to stand trial, punish him with further investigation to find
additional facts that may increase his sentence upon conviction. Id.
4. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d at 1020 (maintaining that "[p]lea bargaining is an approved
method of encouraging guilty pleas")(alteration in original).
5. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48, 751 (1970) (holding that a de-
fendant is not impermissibly enticed to enter into a plea agreement and plead guilty simply
to avoid the possibility of the death penalty if convicted by a jury).
6. Heaney, supra note 2, at 220.
7. Id. On average, a defendant who chooses to stand trial can expect a sentence
twice as long if convicted than the defendant who accepted a plea agreement. Id. None-
theless, the number of guilty pleas entered has decreased since the adoption of the sentenc-
ing guidelines. Id. at 226; see also UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES
SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERA-
TION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 78-80 (1991) [hereinafter
REPORT ON GUIDELINES SYSTEM] (demonstrating that a non-drug-trafficking defendant
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Recognizing that sentencing is the crux of the criminal justice system,8
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984)9 to create a comprehensive, effec-
tive sentencing system based upon a coherent philosophy. 10 The Act
reflects the United States Sentencing Commission's (Sentencing Commis-
sion)" compromise between a simple, uniform sentencing system and an
overly complex system that ultimately would become unmanageable by
providing too many determinate variables.' 2 The Federal Sentencing
could expect a 12 to 39 month reduction for entering a plea agreement under the
Guidelines).
8. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENCING XViii (3d ed. 1994) (em-
phasizing the importance of an effective sentencing system).
9. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 236, 98 Stat. 1837, 2033 (1984) (requiring the General Ac-
counting Office and the Sentencing Commission to study the impact and implementation
of the Sentencing Guidelines).
10. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2-4 (1993)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; see Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983) reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221. This system was
designed to replace criminal sentencing based largely on the rehabilitation model. Id. The
old system required a judge to set the maximum term of imprisonment and allowed the
Parole Commission to determine when the prisoner was sufficiently rehabilitated to war-
rant his release. Id. As the rehabilitative model lost support, judges were left to design
their own methodology of sentencing. Id. This resulted in nationwide sentencing disparity.
Id.
In an attempt to solve the problem of sentencing disparity, the Senate Committee set
several goals for a new sentencing system. Itd at 39. The first goal included producing
legislation to provide a comprehensive and consistent statement of the federal law of sen-
tencing. Id. This legislation would set forth the purposes of the sentencing system along
with a clear statement of the types of sentences available for federal offenders. Id. The
second goal sought to assure fair sentencing by providing for individual analysis, as well as
a pattern of sentencing, in all federal criminal cases. Id. The third goal sought to require a
judge to clearly announce the reasons for the sentence. Id. Finally, the Senate Committee
sought to provide a full range of sentencing options from which an appropriate sentence
may be chosen. Id.
11. The Sentencing Commission is an independent body of the judicial branch charged
with the discretion to promulgate sentencing guidelines under 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988). The
Commission is composed of seven voting members and one nonvoting member. Id. Vot-
ing members of the Commission are appointed to six-year terms and may not serve more
than two full terms. Id. § 992(a),(b); see Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sen-
tencing Commission, P.M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset? 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 289,
292 (1989) (recognizing that the Sentencing Commission is supposed to be "an expert body
rationalizing the judicial function of sentencing toward the objective of greater efficiency in
punishment").
12. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, at 3. Congress sought to narrow the wide disparity in
sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses by attempting to create a reasonably uni-
form system. Id. at 2. Congress also sought to create proportionality in sentencing through
a system that imposed appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing
severity. Id. The sentencing table provides a minimum sentence that is 25 percent lower
than the maximum sentence in the same range, thereby still allowing the trial judge the
opportunity to consider individual characteristics of each defendant in determining where
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Guidelines,' 3 the product of the Commission's efforts, attempt to reach
this compromise by considering the characteristics of both the offense
and the offender.'" The Guidelines include a grid system that sets out the
recommended minimum and maximum sentencing range for various
criminal conduct and criminal history.'5 Theoretically, the system in-
creases uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the range of possible
sentences while providing appropriate proportional sentencing 16 for vari-
ous criminal conduct.' 7 This system is designed to further the basic pur-
in the guideline range a defendant should be sentenced. See id. at 1. For example, if a
defendant's offense level is 25 and criminal history category is IV, the trial judge may
sentence the defendant anywhere from 84-105 months. Id. at Sentencing Table; see also
Lisa Ryan-Boyle, et al., Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 739 (1992) (listing the desire to
equalize sentences for "street criminals" and "white collar" criminals as one of the pur-
poses of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) [hereinafter Ryan-Boyle].
13. The initial guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987. REPORT ON GUIDELINES
SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1.
14. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 4.8, at 89 (2d ed. 1991) (taking
into account individual aspects of the defendant's criminal history and the seriousness of
the current offense category to determine the guideline sentence for the specific act). In
determining a particular defendant's sentence, the judge should: find the applicable guide-
line through the statutory index; determine the base offense level for the criminal activity;
add offense specific characteristics (i.e., gun use or drug quantity); make additional adjust-
ments based upon the defendant's role in the criminal activity and his acceptance of re-
sponsibility; determine the criminal history category based on the defendant's criminal
record; find the applicable guideline range in the sentencing grid; and then impose a sen-
tence. See id. § 4.9, at 93-96.
15. The grid reflects the Commission's efforts to consider both an offender's criminal
history as well as the crime committed. GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUESTIONS
REMAIN UNANSWERED 92-93, 6 (1992). Forty-three offense levels line the left axis of the
grid, ranked from the least serious to the most serious crimes, and six criminal history
categories serve as the top axis. Id. at 8-9. "The intersection of an offender's final offense
level (after all adjustments) and criminal history category determines" the potential sen-
tence range. Id. at 9; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5 (1988) (outlining the
purposes and structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and explaining that the guide-
line ranges are designed so that the top of a sentencing range cannot exceed the bottom by
more than twenty-five percent).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)-(d) (1988) (stating that sentences should be based on of-
fense severity and offender characteristics).
17. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INI-
TIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 13 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT] reprinted in THOMAS W. HUTCHISON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL
SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 153, 169 (Supp. 1989).
Many have questioned the effectiveness of the Guidelines because their goals are often
compromised by prosecutors' and probation officers' noncompliance, manipulation, and
evasion of statutory duties. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing
Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 834 (1992).
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poses of criminal punishment:' 8  deterrence,' 9  incapacitation, °
retribution,21 and rehabilitation;2 2 and attempts to create an equitable
system that considers the public interest, as well as the interests of the
victims and defendants.
23
18. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, at 1; see also SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at
15-16. The Report states:
While a very simple system may produce uniformity, it cannot satisfy the require-
ment of proportionality. To use an extreme example, the Commission ostensibly
could have achieved perfect uniformity simply by specifying that every offender
was to be sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Doing so, however, plainly
would have destroyed proportionality .... [H]aving only a few simple, general
categories of crimes might make the guidelines uniform and easy to administer,
but at the cost of lumping together offenses that are different in important re-
spects ....
A sentencing system tailored to fit every conceivable case, on the other hand,
could become too complex and unworkable. Complexity can seriously compro-
mise the certainty of punishment and its deterrent effect.
Id. at 13; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 14, § 2.1, at 18-19. The media, legislators, judges,
and lawyers would not accept a system that failed to recognize all of these punishment
philosophies. Id. at 21; Parker & Block, supra note 11, at 302 (stating that all of the pur-
poses of punishment ultimately lead to the objective of increasing efficiency in
punishment).
19. Deterrence theories of criminal punishment are based on the principle that punish-
ment systems should deter the commission of future offenses. SANFORD H. KADISH &
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
149 (5th ed. 1989). Deterrence theories are criticized for their assumption that every per-
son has the ability to calculate the future effects of their present conduct. JEREMY BEN-
THAM, Principles of Penal Law, in J. BENTHAM'S WORKS 396, 402 (J. Bowring ed. 1843),
reprinted in KADISH AND SCHULHOFER, supra at 149. The effectiveness of a deterrence
based system is dependant on the criminal justice system's ability to provide substantial
risks of conviction and sufficiently severe punishment. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 158-72
(1973) (discussing the principles of deterrence, and its effect on crime in great detail).
20. The incapacitation theory of punishment is based on the premise that an incarcer-
ated criminal cannot commit more crimes. See KADISH AND SCHULHOFER, supra note 19,
at 160-61.
21. Retributive punishment theories propose to deter criminal behavior by inflicting
pain on an offender for committing a crime. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
(W. Hastie tr. 1887) reprinted in KADISH AND SCHULHOFER, supra note 19, at 137.
22. Rehabilitative theories of punishment center on crime as a curable disease, ulti-
mately focusing on transforming the offender into a productive member of society. See
Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1012-14 (1940).
23. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 16 (describing that the Guidelines
balance aspects of both "just desert and crime-control philosophies of sentencing"); see,
Ryan-Boyle, supra note 12, at 741 (describing three fundamental policies that governed the
Commission's work). "First, the Commission sought to achieve 'honesty' in sentencing by
establishing a scheme of determinate sentences for specific offenses irreducible by parole
or 'good time' credits." Id. Second, the Commission sought to reduce disparity across
jurisdictions by providing detailed guidelines to all federal judges. Id. Finally, the Com-
mission tried to maintain proportionality in sentencing between comparable offenses. Id.
Thus, the Commission balanced uniformity and proportionality, two seemingly contradic-
tory interests, when creating the guideline system. Id; see also Barbara S. Meierhoefer,
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Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines24 encompasses
many of Congress' goals by encouraging a defendant to accept responsi-
bility for his conduct, 25 ensuring efficient and certain punishment,26 and
avoiding potentially lengthy, costly, and emotionally challenging trials.27
Section 3E1.1 allows a two offense-level reduction on the sentencing grid
in exchange for the defendant's acknowledgment that he committed the
charged offense. 28 Further, if the defendant notifies the authorities of his
intention to enter a guilty plea in a timely manner, he may be entitled to
an additional one-level reduction.29 Section 3E1.1 provides reductions
Individualized and Systemic Justice in the Federal Sentencing Process, 29 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 889, 889 (1992) (illustrating a tension between the requirements of "individualized
and systematic justice in the sentencing process").
24. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1, at 248. Specifically, § 3E1.1 of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines states:
Acceptance of Responsibility
(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the offense
level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or
greater, and the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by taking one or more of the following
steps:
(1) timely providing complete information to the government concerning
his own involvement in the offense; or
(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty,
thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently, decrease the
offense level by 1 additional level.
Id. (alterations in original)
25. 1 PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINEs 2-63 (Phylis Skloot
Bamberger & David J. Gottleb eds.) (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 SUPPLEMENT]. Origi-
nally, the defendant had to accept responsibility for the "offense of conviction." Id. at 2-
65. The guideline was amended in 1988 to require the defendant to accept responsibility
for his "criminal conduct." Id. Currently, § 3E1.1 requires the defendant to accept respon-
sibility for "his offense." Id. at 2-66.
26. § 3E1.1, background; CAMPBELL, supra note 14, § 9.8, at 260. After entering a
guilty plea, a presentence report is prepared and the defendant is sentenced by a sentenc-
ing judge. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that the presentence report contain: information on the existence of a prior crimi-
nal record of the defendant; a statement on the circumstances surrounding the offense; a
statement on addressing the amount of harm caused to the victim (including physical,
mental and monetary harm); any other helpful information; a policy statement issued by
the Commission that appears relevant; and, any non-prison programs available to the de-
fendant. Rule 32(c)(2).
27. See CAMPBELL, supra note 14 § 9.8, at 260 (describing plea agreements as "essen-
tial to the expeditious and fair administration of justice").
28. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1(a), at 248.
29. Id. § 3El.1(b)(2), at 248 (providing an additional one-level reduction for a defend-
ant who timely notifies the authorities of his intention to enter a guilty plea, thereby saving
government preparation for trial).
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that recognize pleas as an acceptable and important element in the sen-
tencing process."0 The justifications behind these reductions are substan-
tially similar to those for plea agreements. 3 ' Some judges believe that a
defendant who acknowledges his guilt and accepts responsibility for his
actions is less likely to commit future offenses.3 2 Judges also acknowl-
edge an interest in rewarding defendants for reducing the burden on the
court system, 33 and recognize that some assertions in the defendant's pre-
sentencing report3 4 ultimately may not be provable at trial or convincing
to a jury.
35
Opponents of section 3E1.1 contend that rewarding a guilty plea with a
lesser sentence is functionally equivalent to making a defendant pay for
30. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 204 (considering the Commissions'
intention to apply § 3E1.1 primarily to defendants who plead guilty).
31. Id. Specifically, the Commission acknowledges a judicial tendency to believe that
a defendant who enters a guilty plea is less likely to commit further crimes. Id. The Com-
mission also notes judicial and prosecutorial desire to reward defendants for reducing the
burden on the court system without compromising just and immediate punishment. Id. at
204-05; see U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6B1.1, at 316 (describing the intention behind the
Sentencing Guidelines to ensure that plea negotiation practices "promote the statutory
purposes of sentencing prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)").
The Sentencing Commission determined factors to be considered in imposing a sentence,
and specifically stated:
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider...
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988).
32. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 204 (recognizing the lower probability
of recidivism for defendants who accept responsibility for their criminal conduct).
33. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (identifying a legitimate inter-
est in preserving prosecutorial and judicial resources to justify a sentencing system favoring
guilty pleas); SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 204-05.
34. See U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 6A1.1 (requiring a probation officer to conduct a
presentence investigation and report to the court prior to the imposition of a sentence
unless the record contains sufficient information to allow the sentencing court to make a
meaningful sentencing decision).
35. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 204 (acknowledging that lower
sentences may be imposed after a defendant enters a guilty plea, versus after he is con-
victed, because "some of the relevant factors that appear in the presentence report might
not be provable at trial" thus reducing the sentence a defendant would have received if he
went to trial).
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his constitutional right to a trial with an increased sentence. 6 However,
3E1.1 is recognized as providing the only possible reward for a defendant
entering a guilty plea.3 7 Consequently, plea bargaining under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and particularly section 3E1.1 is a subject of Con-
gressional and constitutional debate.3 8 The "Acceptance of Responsibil-
ity" reduction is particularly vulnerable to attack because it is less likely
to be granted to a defendant who chooses to go to trial.39 While courts
uphold the constitutionality of the current 3E1.1 guideline, many courts
maintain that a guideline completely excluding defendants from the same
reduction solely because they choose to go to trial would fail a constitu-
tional challenge under both the Fifth4' and Fourteenth4 Amendments. 42
36. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (stating that a unilateral
imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who chose to exercise a legal right is unconstitu-
tional); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269-70 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that a judge
may not place a price tag on the right to trial by requiring a guilty plea for leniency); see
also, Andrew Neal Siegel, Note, The Sixth Amendment on Ice-United States v. Jones:
Whether Sentence Enhancements for Failure to Plead Guilty Chill the Exercise of the Right
to Trial, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 645, 683-84 (1994) (suggesting that the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission propose an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines prohibiting judges
from denying a sentence reduction based solely on a defendant's decision not to plead
guilty).
37. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 204; REPORT ON GUIDELINES SYSTEM,
supra note 7, at 23 (identifying "a motion for a departure based upon substantial assist-
ance, a recommendation for awarding acceptance of responsibility, or a recommendation
for a sentence at the low end of the guideline range.., as the most important incentives [a
prosecutor] can offer" to encourage a guilty plea). Defense attorneys generally view
"charge bargaining" as the greatest incentive for pleas. See id.
38. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 238, 244
(1989).
39. United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1363 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S.
Ct. 1026 (1993); see infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text (illustrating how defendants
who go to trial rarely receive the "Acceptance of Responsibility" reduction). A study of
imposed sentences revealed that 88% of defendants pleading guilty received the "Accept-
ance of Responsibility" reduction compared to only 20% of those convicted at trial who
received the reduction. REPORT ON GUIDELINES SYSTEM supra note 7, at 78.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. V (establishing the constitutional privilege against self-incrim-
ination); see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (establishing that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, applies during sentencing).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (establishing the privileges of due process and equal
protection).
42. See Saunders, 973 F.2d at 1362 (implying that if the acceptance of responsibility
provision was completely unavailable to defendants electing to go to trial, constitutional
problems involving one's right to trial may emerge); United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d
193, 198 (11th Cir.) (vacating a sentence where the sentencing judge expressly made the
acceptance of responsibility reduction dependant on the defendant's decision whether to
go to trial), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 649 (1992); see also Siegel, supra note 36, at 650-51
(discussing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of due process as a restric-
tion on sentencing bias against defendants who have exercised their Sixth Amendment
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The Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the
United States Courts asked the Sentencing Commission to consider a de-
linkage of subsections (a) and (b) of section 3E1.1. 43 This delinkage
would allow a court to reduce a defendant's sentence upon the submis-
sion of a timely plea, while evaluating separately whether he is entitled to
an additional reduction for "clearly demonstrat[ing]" other forms of ac-
ceptance of responsibility." This revision could provide an automatic
sentence reduction to a defendant entering a guilty plea without exclud-
ing those who exercise their right to go to trial from demonstrating ac-
ceptance of responsibility through other means.45 This proposal would
prohibit a defendant who elects to go to trial from receiving the reduction
under section 3EL.1(2)(b) unless he admits his culpability but goes to trial
for some purpose other than refuting his factual guilt.46 This proposal
distinguishes between denying a defendant a benefit and penalizing him
for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial.47 The Sentencing
Commission recognizes this distinction in the current acceptance of re-
sponsibility provision, section 3E1.1. 48 However, under the current pro-
vision, courts are granting some defendants who choose to go to trial a
right to a jury trial). This Comment proposes that § 3E1.1 provide an automatic two-level
reduction in exchange for entering a guilty plea and, exclude defendants who go to trial
from getting the same reduction.
43. Letter from Maryanne Trump Barry, Chair, Committee on Criminal Law of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, to Hon. Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman, United
States Sentencing Commission 5-6 (Nov. 15, 1994); see supra note 24 (outlining subsection
(a) and (b) and posing the delinkage issue).
44. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1, at 248. Other forms of acceptance of responsibil-
ity include; presentencing efforts to make restitution, efforts toward rehabilitation, and as-
sisting the authorities with the investigation of their own or related criminal activities. Id.
45. The Sentencing Commission previously considered a provision rewarding a de-
fendant for entering a guilty plea with an automatic reduction. William W. Wilkins, Jr.,
Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the Offender, and Departures: Pol-
icy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 181, 190-91 (1988). The automatic sentence reduction proposal was rejected, how-
ever, because the Commission claimed that such a proposal rewarded a defendant without
regard for "the circumstances of the offense or the defendant's post-offense conduct."
Luke T. Dokla, Note, Section 3E1.I Contrition and Fifth Amendment Incrimination: Is
There an Iron Fist Beneath the Sentencing Guidelines' Velvet Glove? 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1077, 1090-91 (1991).
46. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1, at 249 (stating that a defendant who chooses to
put the government to its burden by selecting to go to trial, and who is convicted ulti-
mately, is not entitled to a reduction when he admits guilt and expresses remorse only the
after he is convicted).
47. See infra notes 62-90 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
penalizing a defendant's right to go to trial and recognizing his acceptance of responsibility
through a reduction in his sentence).
48. See U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3El.1, at 249 (stating that the reduction is not in-
tended for defendants electing to go to trial); see also Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Re-
sponse to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 795, 806 (1992) (recognizing that the
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sentence reduction if they express remorse for the consequences of their
conduct and accept responsibility after being found guilty.49 Further,
courts are misinterpreting the current guideline by finding that where a
defendant has entered a guilty plea and has received a two-level decrease
for accepting responsibility, he is necessarily entitled to an additional
one-level reduction for notifying the authorities of his intention to enter a
guilty plea.5" This was not the original intent of the Sentencing Commis-
sion.51 The proposal to delink sections (a) and (b) of 3E1.1 would limit
this kind of misapplication of the Guidelines.
This Comment addresses the constitutional and public policy issues sur-
rounding section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. First, this
Comment describes the 3E1.1 Acceptance of Responsibility provision as
it is currently written. This Comment next analyzes the applicable case
law outlining the constitutional and punishment issues surrounding the
application of guilty plea incentives. Next, this Comment evaluates the
case law that challenges the current application of section 3E1.1. Addi-
tionally, this Comment presents an alternative sentencing guideline for
accepting responsibility, and evaluates its benefits in light of the estab-
lished case law and public policy. Finally, this Comment proposes to alter
section 3E1.1 to address the original purpose of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, while still withstanding judicial review.
I. THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE SECTION 3E1.1 ACCEPTANCE
OF RESPONSIBILITY GUIDELINE
Section 3E1.1, otherwise known as the Acceptance of Responsibility
provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, rewards a defendant who
admission of guilt by entering a guilty plea is consistent with any accepted notion of Ac-
ceptance of Responsibility).
49. See United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1363 (7th Cir. 1992) (considering a
defendant's post trial expression of remorse in deciding whether to grant the acceptance of
responsibility reduction), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1026 (1993).
50. United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1993) The defendant pled guilty
to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute marihuana. Id. at 1121. The
defendant received a two-level sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility but was
denied the additional one-level reduction for timely entering a guilty plea. Id. The court
found that denying the extra one-level reduction was not harmless error and vacated the
defendant's sentence. Id.
51. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1, at 249 application note 2 (explaining that the
reduction is not intended to apply to a defendant who denies the essential factual elements
of guilt until after being found guilty); see id. at application note 6 (explaining that "to
qualify under subsection (b)(2), the defendant must have notified authorities of his inten-
tion to enter a plea of guilty" early enough in the trial process to allow the government to
conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources by avoiding trial preparation and allowing
efficient scheduling of the court calendar).
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accepts responsibility for his acts with a two-level reduction in the
charged offense level.12 Further, if the defendant qualifies for the two-
level reduction and either provides complete information concerning his
involvement in the offense, or notifies the authorities of his intention to
plead guilty in a timely fashion, he may receive an additional one-level
reduction. 3 The commentary following section 3E1.1 generally denies
this same reduction to a defendant who puts the government to its bur-
den of proof by exercising his right to a trial. 4
According to the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who exercises his
constitutional right to trial rarely will qualify for the Acceptance of Re-
sponsibility reduction because he has not demonstrated a willingness to
accept responsibility for his criminal conduct. 55 For instance, the reduc-
tion is not available to a defendant who denies his criminal conduct on
the stand but then essentially admits to perjury56 in an attempt to receive
the reduction after being found guilty.57 Moreover, the Guidelines pro-
vide that a defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to receive
52. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3El.l(a), at 248.
53. Id. § 3El.1(b). For example, a defendant possessing a criminal history category
level of III and an offense level of 20 could be sentenced to 41-51 months. Id. at 270.
After the two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction combined with a one-level re-
duction for timely entering a plea or providing information to the government concerning
one's culpable conduct, the sentencing range could be reduced to 30-37 months. Id.
54. Id. § 3E1.1, at 249. In application note 2 of the comments to Section 3E1.1, the
Sentencing Commission states: "This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant
who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual
elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse." Id.
55. Cf. id. "In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of
responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a
trial." Id. This may occur when a defendant goes to trial for reasons other than to chal-
lenge factual guilt, for example, to constitutionally challenge a statute or the applicability
of a statute to his conduct. Id.
Even though the Sentencing Guidelines do not generally provide for a sentence reduc-
tion, 16% of the defendants who go to trial get an "acceptance of responsibility" reduction.
Heaney, supra note 2, at 179.
56. See U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3C1.1, at 234-35. The Commission states: "If the
defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the admin-
istration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant of-
fense, increase the offense level by 2 levels." Id.; see United States v. Payne, 962 F.2d 1228,
1236 (6th Cir.) (affirming the denial of an "acceptance of responsibility" reduction for a
defendant found to have testified untruthfully), cert. denied, 13 S. Ct. 811 (1992); United
States v. Zayas, 876 F.2d 1057, 1060 (1st Cir. 1989) (affirming the denial of an acceptance
of responsibility reduction when the defendant is found to have perjured himself).
57. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, at 108 app. C, application note 258 (1983); see id. § 3C1.1.
at 234-35 (quoted supra note 56). Application note 3 to § 3C1.1 states: "The following is a
non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which this enhancement applies:
... (b) committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury; ... (f) providing materi-
ally false information to a judge or magistrate . . ." Id. § 3C1.1., at 234-35, application note
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the reduction as a matter of right.58 In fact, the defendant must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the reduction
based upon his acceptance of responsibility.59
The decisions challenging the application of 3E1.1 create uncertainty
regarding the proper use of sentence reductions.6" This confusion fosters
differing opinions on the constitutional implications and interpretations
of the Acceptance of Responsibility methodology.61
A. Denying the Benefit Penalizes a Defendant who Stands Trial
In pre-guideline cases, the United States Supreme Court cautioned that
sentencing decisions should not coerce defendants to waive a constitu-
tional right.62 These early decisions establish the foundation for critics'
arguments that the current application of section 3E1.1 is an unconstitu-
tional burden on a defendant's right to a fair trial.63
The Supreme Court reiterated its interest in ensuring that constitution-
ally protected conduct should not be considered against a defendant dur-
ing the sentencing process in North Carolina v. Pearce.64  Pearce
establishes that punishing a person "because he has done what the law
plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic
sort."6
5
58. Id. at 249, application note 3.
59. United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 924 (10th Cir. 1990) cert. denied sub nom,
Corbin v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1124 (1994); United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d
1234, 1238-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989).
60. See, e.g., Heaney, supra note 2, at 179-80 (demonstrating the great disparity be-
tween districts in applying the acceptance of responsibility reduction to defendants who
went to trial and were found guilty).
61. See id. at 220-23 (illustrating how the guidelines system infringes a defendant's
constitutional right to trial and right to testify).
62. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (reiterating that it is a
due process violation to penalize a defendant for exercising a constitutional right); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968) (deciding that a statute requiring the death
penalty for defendants convicted by a jury while guaranteeing life imprisonment for de-
fendants entering guilty pleas is unconstitutional).
63. See Siegel, supra note 36, at 652-53 (criticizing the court's decision to deny an
Acceptance of Responsibility reduction based on one's decision to stand trial in United
States v. Jones).
64. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
65. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); see also North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1969) (finding that the imposition of a greater sentence on a
defendant for taking an appeal would violate the Due Process Clause).
Bordenkircher also acknowledges, however, that the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining
does not provide for a retaliatory opportunity to punish a defendant for not accepting a
plea bargain as long as the defendant may accept or reject the prosecution's offer.
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363.
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In Pearce, the Court confronted the constitutional limitations on a
judge imposing a harsher sentence upon a defendant after a conviction is
set aside and a new conviction is entered upon retrial.66 The Court found
that the trial judge may impose a new sentence that is either greater or
less than the original sentence upon retrial without violating the Constitu-
tion.67 However, the Court also noted that states would flagrantly violate
the Fourteenth Amendment if they were allowed to impose a longer sen-
tence on a reconvicted defendant to punish him for successfully setting
aside an original conviction.68 Consequently, the Court held that judges
cannot impose a vindictive sentence that penalizes a defendant for going
to trial or exercising his right to appeal. 69 The Court required that when-
ever a judge imposes a more severe sentence after a new trial, the judge's
decision must clearly demonstrate that the reasoning was not based on
vindictiveness stemming from the defendant's use of constitutionally pro-
tected behavior.7° Instead, the newer, harsher sentence must be based on
objective information concerning identifiable conduct by the defendant.7 '
Pearce lays a foundational argument that a price cannot be placed on a
constitutional right by forcing a defendant to serve a longer sentence.72
Pearce also establishes that a defendant should be free from apprehen-
sion of retaliatory behavior by the sentencing judge.73
In United States v. Jackson,74 the Supreme Court held that a statute
that even needlessly encourages a defendant to enter a guilty plea is an
66. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 713. Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to commit
rape. Id. He received a sentence of 12 to 15 years. Id. Several years later, Pearce re-
ceived a retrial based on an involuntary confession that was wrongfully admitted into evi-
dence creating constitutional error. Id. Upon retrial and conviction, the sentencing judge
imposed an eight-year prison term, which, when added to the time he had already served,
amounted to a higher sentence. Id. Pearce challenged his sentence on constitutional
grounds. Id. at 713-15.
67. Id. at 723 (stating that the freedom of a sentencing judge to consider, for example,
the defendant's conduct in the second trial or before the second trial, is not precluded by
the Equal Protection Clause).
68. Id. at 723-24 (stating that it would be "patently unconstitutional" to impose a pun-
ishment for exercising a constitutional right) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 581 (1968)).
69. Id. at 725-26 (providing that a judge may impose a more severe sentence upon
retrial only if the judge can clearly demonstrate with an explanation in the record that the
second sentence imposed was not vindictive).
70. Id. at 725 (deciding that the fear of vindictiveness unconstitutionally burdens a
defendant's right to an appeal).
71. Id. at 726.
72. Id. at 724.
73. See id. at 725 (establishing that a retaliatory motivation behind a sentencing deci-
sion should not play a part in the defendant's free exercise of constitutional rights).
74. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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impermissible infringement on a constitutional right.75 Jackson involved
a kidnaping statute that permitted a jury to impose the death sentence
under specific circumstances. 76 The statute, however, did not allow the
imposition of the death penalty for defendants who pled guilty.77 The
Government argued that the goal of limiting the death penalty to jury
recommended cases was a legitimate interest that only incidently chilled a
defendant's ability to contest the charges. 78 The Court held that the dif-
ferent statutorily imposed penalties unconstitutionally encouraged de-
fendants to forfeit their right to a jury trial.79 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court considered the lack of alternatives available to advance the
goal of jury control over the imposition of the death sentence, without
hindering the defendant's right to a jury trial.8" Specifically, the Jackson
Court reiterated that a "procedure need not be inherently coercive in
order that it be held to impose an impermissible burden upon the asser-
tion of a constitutional right."'"
Similarly, after the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
courts considered some situations where the application of the Accept-
ance of Responsibility provision could be unconstitutional.82 In United
75. Id. at 572 (holding that the portion of the Federal Kidnapping Act providing for
the death penalty only after a trial conviction, but not for defendants who enter a guilty
plea, impermissibly burdens the right to a jury trial).
76. Id. at 581. If the defendant went to trial and the jury found him guilty he could be
sentenced to death. Id.
77. Id. (finding that the statute has no other purpose than to chill the exercise of con-
stitutionally protected rights by penalizing those who exercise them).
78. Id. at 582. The government argued that the purpose of the statute was to lessen
the severity of punishment, making irrelevant any incidental effect which persuades the
defendants not to contest the charge. Id.
79. Id. at 582-83; see also ROBERT 0. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO
TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 175 (Frank J. Remington ed. 1969) A
study on judges' opinions that allowed a reduction in sentence in exchange for a guilty plea
found that one group of judges questioned whether such an enticement could be regarded
on appeal as involuntary and void because the policy might encourage an innocent person
to forego trial and plead guilty for fear of being penalized with a harsher sentence by a
jury. Id.; DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICnION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNO-
CENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 4 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966) (questioning whether non-trial
adjudication practices resulting in a conviction adequately fulfill the basic objective of sep-
arating the guilty from the innocent). Newman acknowledged a concern that the accuracy
of a guilty plea is based on a "voluntariness" test. Id. at 10.
80. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582 (providing, as an alternative, that the choice between life
imprisonment and capital punishment could always be left to a jury, regardless of how the
defendant's guilt was determined).
81. Id. at 583.
82. United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1990) (agreeing that compelled
self-incrimination is an unconstitutional application and denial of a § 3El.1 reduction when
applied to pre-plea conduct).
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States v. Watt,83 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided that a judge could not hold constitutionally protected conduct
against a defendant in deciding whether to grant him an Acceptance of
Responsibility reduction.' The defendant in Watt entered a guilty plea
but also invoked his Miranda85 rights during an FBI interrogation.86 The
probation officer recommended that Watt be denied a sentence reduction
because he did not assist in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentali-
ties of the crime.87 During sentencing, the trial court analyzed Watt's de-
cision not to assist the government and also considered the defendant's
decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion during sentencing.88 The trial court decided to deny the 3E1.1 reduc-
tion on these grounds.89 The Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence because
it was predicated on Watt's refusal to waive his Fifth Amendment
privilege.
90
83. 910 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1990).
84. Id. at 592 (deciding that a court may not consider the defendant's failure to assist
police in gathering inculpatory evidence as evidence that the defendant did not accept
responsibility).
85. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (establishing the privilege against
self-incrimination).
86. Watt, 910 F.2d at 588. Watt was charged with armed robbery in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a),(d), and with use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Id. Watt entered a guilty plea for the lesser included
offense of unarmed bank robbery in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation that
he receive the acceptance of responsibility reduction in computing his sentence. Id. The
probation officer, however, recommended that the defendant be denied the acceptance of
responsibility reduction for failure to cooperate in the investigation or assist in recovering
the money. Id.
87. Id. The defendant did not provide any assistance in recovering stolen property
and made no attempt to make restitution prior to entering a guilty plea. Id.
88. Id. at 592. The court may not consider against the defendant his requested assist-
ance of counsel or reliance on his Miranda protection against self-incrimination. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 593. The court held that "the district court erred in concluding that Watt's
failure to assist in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime 'counts
against him.' " Id.
In a more recent decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
in United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1989), that a reduction in sentence
cannot depend upon acceptance of responsibility for charges dismissed in a plea agree-
ment. Id. at 464. The denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction for failing to
plead guilty to other charged conduct could not be used to penalize the defendant for
invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. This provides an-




B. No Constitutional Error in Rewarding a Guilty Plea
Established case law holds that the denial of a sentence reduction pur-
suant to section 3E1.1 does not constitute a penalty9' or enhancement of
a sentence for exercising the constitutional right to a trial.92 These cases
demonstrate that offering a more lenient sentence in exchange for an ad-
mission of guilt is not exercising a draconian policy of penalizing all who
elect to stand trial. 3 Constitutional error is not to be assigned simply
because the risks and consequences may differ among alternative trial
tactics for a defendant.94
These principles were established before the enactment of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.95 The Supreme Court decided, in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,9 6 that a prosecutor may entice a defendant to enter a guilty plea
91. A penalty is defined as punishment Which operates to compel desired perform-
ance. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (6th ed. 1990). Courts have found a distinction
between penalizing a defendant for going to trial and rewarding guilty pleas. See, e.g.,
United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1086 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Parker, 903
F.2d 91, 105 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1989).
92. United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 924-25 (10th Cir.) (holding that the accept-
ance of responsibility provision does not unconstitutionally require a defendant to forego
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990).
The court also distinguishes between increasing a sentence for failure to demonstrate re-
morse and refusing to grant a reduction from the prescribed base offense level. Id.; see
also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978) (establishing that not every burden or
pressure to forego a constitutional right is invalid); United States v. Cordell, 924 F.2d 614,
619 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that even though § 3E1.1 may influence how a defendant
chooses to respond to the government's case, it is not unconstitutional to reward a guilty
plea); United States v. Ross, 920 F.2d 1530, 1537 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the defendant's
claim that the acceptance of responsibility provision required him to plead guilty to all
charged conduct thus violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
93. United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that
§ 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, permitting leniency for accepting responsibility for
criminal activity, does not enable courts to enhance punishment); United States v. White,
869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.) (finding that the imposition of a lenient sentence on a "contrite
defendant" does not mean that those who stand trial are penalized), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1112 (1989); United States v. Thompson, 476 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir.) (finding that grant-
ing leniency to remorseful defendants who admit their guilt does not mean that courts
follow a policy of penalizing those who stand trial), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 918 (1973); see
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1977) (finding that the prosecutor permissibly
may discourage a defendant from asserting his right to a trial by disclosing his intent to
pursue further charges if a guilty plea is not entered).
94. See United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119, 122 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990) (dismissing a
challenge to the constitutionality of § 3E1.1 and noting a difference between failing to
show lenience toward a defendant and penalizing a defendant), aff'd, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32978 (7th Cir. 1992).
95. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (finding no constitutional viola-
tion when a prosecutor encourages a defendant to enter a guilty plea by threatening to
reindict the accused on more serious charges).
96. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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by offering not to pursue more serious charges against the defendant.97
In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor attempted to dissuade the defendant
from entering a plea of not guilty by offering to recommend a five-year
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. 98 The prosecutor also conveyed
that if the defendant didn't "save the court the inconvenience and neces-
sity of a trial" by entering a guilty plea, he would seek an indictment
under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act, subjecting the defendant to a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for having two prior convic-
tions.99 The Court found that the prosecutor's actions were not materi-
ally different from a grand jury indictment that included a charge under
the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act where the prosecutor offered to
drop the Habitual Criminal charge in exchange for a guilty plea.100 The
threat of further pursuit of criminal charges was not found to be a vindic-
tive act. 01 The Court differentiated this situation from the issue
presented in Pearce by acknowledging a more equal bargaining ability
between the parties during plea negotiations.10 2 The Court concluded
that a prosecutor may selectively pursue charges in an attempt to per-
suade the defendant to plead guilty without violating the constitutional
rights of the defendant.10 3
Similarly, the issue has arisen since the enactment of the Sentencing
Guidelines whether the judicial application of guidelines may persuade a
defendant to enter a guilty plea by denying a sentence reduction to a
defendant who goes to trial. In United States v. Jones,"° the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to reduce a
defendant's sentence the entire two-levels for acceptance of responsibil-
ity. 105 The defendant in Jones originally received a two-level reduction
for accepting responsibility in recognition of his sincere remorse and ad-
97. Id. at 357 (stating that the prosecutor's conduct "merely presented the defendant
with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly
subject to prosecution").
98. Id. at 358.
99. Id. at 358-59.
100. Id. at 361.
101. Id. at 362.
102. Id. at 362-63. The Court differentiated the situations by pointing out the Pearce
decision dealt with "the State's unilateral imposition of a penalty" whereas the plea bar-
gaining stages of trial provided a "relatively equal bargaining power." Id. at 362.
103. Id. at 364.
104. 973 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, reh'g granted, en banc, 980 F.2d 746 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), and adhered to on reh'g, en banc, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 741 (1994).
105. 973 F.2d at 932-33, 938 (recommending that the defendant not get the full two-
level reduction under the "acceptance of responsibility" provision after not providing a




mission after the trial finding that he was guilty of the charged conduct.10 6
However, the trial court decided that the defendant, after the benefit of
putting the government to its burden of proof, should not receive the full
benefit of the reduction, "in view of the fact that [the defendant] simply
has acknowledged that he was guilty of what the jury found him guilty
of."' 07 The District of Columbia Circuit framed the issue as whether a
sentencing judge may take the defendant's decision to stand trial into ac-
count when determining the defendant's sentence, within the applicable
range, after granting the two-level Acceptance of Responsibility reduc-
tion.108 This case explicitly held that during sentencing, a judge may con-
sider the defendant's decision to stand trial as an indication that the
defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.10 9
The court reasoned that a sentencing order that had enhanced the de-
fendant's sentence by six months for wasting the state's time was a denial
of the full benefit allowed under section 3E1.1 as opposed to a penalty for
standing trial.110 The trial judge stated that he would have sentenced the
defendant to the minimum allowable penalty under the sentencing guide-
line range if a guilty plea had been entered before trial."' Because the
defendant took the case to trial, however, the judge added six months to
the guideline sentence, stating that there should be some reward for
106. 997 F.2d at 1476. "The presumptive sentencing range, based on appellant's Crimi-
nal History Category (I) and the applicable Base Offense Level (34), was 151 to 188
months." Id. After the defendant received the two-level reduction, his sentencing range
was 121-to-151 months. Id.
107. Id. The sentencing judge chose not to sentence the defendant in the lowest end of
the sentencing range because he felt the defendant did not provide any defense to the
charges against him. Id. The judge decided that the defendant's lack of any defense to the
charged conduct should not be rewarded by imposing the lowest possible sentence. Id. Cf.
United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1992) (overturning a decision to give a
defendant only half of a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
108. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1476.
The issue presented in this case is quite straightforward: whether a sentencing
judge who grants a defendant credit for acceptance of responsibility, thereby put-
ting the defendant in a lower range under the Sentencing Guidelines, may take
account of the defendant's decision to go to trial when sentencing within the new,
lower range.
Id.
109. Id. The court noted that granting a two-level decrease for accepting responsibility
did not require that the defendant be sentenced at the bottom of that range. Id. at 1479.
110. Id. The judge essentially granted an Acceptance of Responsibility reduction, but
enhanced the defendant's sentence within the resulting sentencing range by adding six
months to the minimum possible sentence. See id. However, the sentence was still within
the sentencing range available after the reduction. Id.
111. United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir.) vacated in part, reh'g granted,
en banc, 980 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and adhered to on reh'g, en banc, 997 F.2d 1475
(D.C. Dir 1993), and cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 741 (1994); see supra note 107, and accompany-
ing text.
1995] 1285
Catholic University Law Review
pleading guilty before trial.112 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals decided
that it was perfectly acceptable for a trial judge to consider that the tim-
ing of a defendant's acceptance of responsibility may permit a lesser or
greater penalty.'
1 3
Not only may courts deny a full two-level reduction to a defendant who
stands trial, but the Supreme Court has upheld sentences that reward de-
fendants for entering guilty pleas." 4 The Supreme Court, in Corbitt v.
New Jersey," 5 recognized that legislatures may encourage guilty pleas by
reducing the sentence imposed on defendants who plead guilty." 6 The
New Jersey homicide statute at issue in Corbitt mandated life imprison-
ment for a first degree murder conviction, but permitted a lesser sentence
if the defendant entered a plea of non vult or nolo contendere before
trial.'17 The Court reasoned that because the risk of life imprisonment
was not avoided completely by entering a guilty plea, and the defendant
did not necessarily benefit by entering a guilty plea, the New Jersey stat-
ute imposed no unconstitutional burden on Corbitt's right to a jury
trial.' 18 Recognizing that no rule had emerged against encouraging guilty
pleas, the Court held that a state may encourage a guilty plea by offering
112. 973 F.2d at 932. The judge awarded the acceptance of responsibility reduction, but
increased the sentence by six months for not providing any defense and wasting the court's
time. See id. The judge encouraged a constitutional review of his imposed sentence and
his decision not to grant an Acceptance of Responsibility reduction because the defendant
did not provide more than a frivolous defense to the charged offense. Id.
113. United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114 S.Ct.
741 (1994). Chief Judge Mikva, adamantly disagreed, citing Scott v. United States, 419
F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969), as supporting the argument that differential sentencing,
which puts a price tag on a fair trial, is unconstitutional. Id. at 1481 (Mikva, C.J.,
dissenting).
114. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978) (acknowledging that it is ac-
ceptable for a statute to "encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return
for the plea"). Substantial benefits may include the possibility of avoiding a life sentence
or similar reduction in a sentence. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970)
(providing that a substantial benefit may include a lesser penalty than the court could im-
pose after a guilty verdict); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363-65 (1978)
(holding that it is acceptable to present a defendant with options which make entering a
plea bargaining agreement before trial the most attractive alternative available to the de-
fendant); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 14-
1.8(a)(iv) (2d ed. 1980) (providing that courts may grant sentence concessions to an of-
fender who has "given or offered cooperation" in the event of a guilty plea).
115. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).
116. Id. at 218-19.
117. Id. at 215. The statute further provided that if the judge accepts the plea, "the
punishment 'shall be either imprisonment for life or the same as that imposed upon a
conviction of murder in the second degree.' " Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 113-3
(West 1969)).
118. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218.
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substantial benefits l ' 9 to a defendant in return for the plea.120 The de-
fendant's plea may result in a shorter sentence than that possibly im-
posed, or even required by statute, following a guilty verdict at trial, and
may provide a lesser penalty than a jury is required to impose after a
guilty verdict.'
21
The Corbitt Court recognized that although section 3E1.1 may affect a
criminal defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, "not every bur-
den on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.' 22 Available alterna-
tives posing different risks and consequences do not render the process
unconstitutional. 23 The defendant must choose between the possibility
of leniency for entering a plea, or a mandatory penalty if convicted at
trial.' 24 The Corbitt decision concluded that a defendant convicted at
119. See supra note 114 (providing an explanation of substantial benefits).
120. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218-19.
121. Id. at 219-20; see Brady, 397 U.S. at 751 (finding that "the defendant's desire to
accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty" did not compel the entering of a
guilty plea for Fifth Amendment purposes where counsel advised the defendant that the
judge had a reputation for being more lenient toward defendants who plead guilty than
those who exercised their right to a trial).
122. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218. The Corbitt Court held that withholding the possibility of
leniency from those who stand trial "cannot be equated with impermissible punishment as
long as our cases sustaining plea bargaining remain undisturbed." Id. at 223-24 (recogniz-
ing that the plea bargaining system inherently extends leniency to defendants who plead
guilty). Plea bargaining inherently creates the possibility of leniency that becomes unavail-
able after trial. Id. at 224; see also United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir.
1989) (confirming that, while "[s]ection 3E1.1 may add to the dilemmas facing criminal
defendants," the provision does not punish defendants for exercising their rights).
123. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
district courts have been free to consider a defendant's acceptance of responsibility in mak-
ing sentencing decisions long before the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines).
124. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized freedom of choice as an important
consideration in determining the constitutionality of criminal sentences. Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). In Bordenkircher, Hayes was charged with uttering a
forged instrument. Id. at 358. At the time, the punishment for this offense was two to ten
years in prison. Id. The prosecutor agreed to recommend a five-year sentence in exchange
for a guilty plea. Id. The prosecutor also warned the defendant that if he did not enter a
guilty plea, the state would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act.
Id. Under this Act, Hayes would receive a mandatory life sentence because he had two
prior felony convictions. Id. at 358-59. Choosing not to plead guilty, Hayes was indicted
under the Act and received a life sentence at trial. Id. at 359. Hayes challenged the sen-
tence as an unconstitutional penalty for not accepting the prosecutor's plea bargain. Id.
The Court found the prosecutor's use of the habitual offender indictment as leverage in the
bargaining process to be proper. Id. at 365. The Bordenkircher Court concluded that the
crucial factor in determining the constitutionality of a sentence was the defendant's free-
dom to choose between sentencing options. Id. at 363 (stating that "there is no ... element
of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecu-
tion's offer"); see also, supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing the constitu-
tionality of plea agreements in Bordenkircher).
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trial is not penalized for demanding a jury trial any more than a defend-
ant who plead guilty is penalized for forfeiting a chance of acquittal.1
25
The court in United States v. Rogers126 applied this reasoning after the
promulgation and enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.127 In
Rogers, the defendant argued that section 3E1.1 violated his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by requiring him to fur-
ther incriminate himself to avoid the penalty of not receiving the reduc-
tion.'28 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
no violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. The Court dif-
ferentiated between "increasing the severity of a sentence for failure to
demonstrate remorse and refusing to grant a reduction from the pre-
scribed base offense level.' 29 The court further noted that extending le-
niency to a cooperative defendant is different from administering
additional punishment to a defendant who remains silent. 30 Thus, the
court concluded that section 3E1.1 did not compel the defendant to in-
criminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
3'
C. A Court May Not Base the Severity of a Sentence Solely Upon a
Defendant's Decision to Stand Trial
Other case law suggests that because sentence reductions under section
3E1.1 are neither awarded automatically nor withheld according to the
defendant's decision to go to trial, the provision is constitutional. 32 In
United States v. Rodriguez, for instance, the court held that as long as
the leniency decision is not based solely on the defendant's decision to
stand trial, the defendant's constitutional rights are not impaired.1'3  The
125. Corbin, 439 U.S. at 226. Courts have upheld on similar grounds disparity in sen-
tencing between co-defendants based on a defendant's choice to enter a guilty plea or to
provide an incriminating statement in the presentencing interview. See United States v.
Trujillo, 906 F.2d 1456, 1464-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 962 (1990).
126. 899 F.2d 917 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 919. During a presentence interview, the defendant admitted to trafficking
24 ounces of heroin instead of the five ounces alleged in the indictment. Id. at 918. The
defendant claimed that the admission was necessary to obtain the Acceptance of Responsi-
bility reduction. Id. The court characterized the defendant's belief as "unwitt[y]" behav-
ior. Id. at 919.
129. Id. at 924-25.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 649 (1992); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1026 (1993); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1990).
133. 959 F.2d 193 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 649 (1992).
134. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d at 197; see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SENTENC-
ING at 81 (3d ed. 1994). The ABA, through the Amercan Bar Association's Criminal Jus-
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Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence because
the trial judge had conditioned the defendant's receipt of the Acceptance
of Responsibility reduction upon the defendant's forfeiture of his right to
appeal. 135 The trial judge in Rodriguez stated that the ultimate test of
acceptance of responsibility could be whether the defendant pursues an
appeal, 136 and reasoned that an appeal is indicative of a defendant's fail-
ure to accept responsibility. 137 The judge had asked the defendants to
admit, under oath, that they were guilty of the indicted offenses and then
inquired as to whether they intended to appeal their convictions.138 The
judge proceeded to impose sentences based on the defendants' an-
swers. 139 The appellate court vacated the sentences, but recognized the
importance of a defendant's conduct in determining whether to grant a
reduction.14° Ultimately, the appellate court held that the sentencing
judge should weigh all of the recommended justifications for a reduction
in the defendant's favor, but may not weigh against the defendant his
decision to exercise a constitutional right.
141
tice Standards Project, promulgated standards for state sentencing systems. Id. at xvii.
These standards propose that it is inappropriate to penalize the exercise of one's Sixth
Amendment right to trial by automatically forbidding consideration of a potentially rele-
vant mitigating factor, regardless of the unlikelihood of its existence in "run-of-the-mill"
cases. Id.
135. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d at 196-97.
136. Id. at 196.
137. Id. at 196-97; see also Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1974). The
judge's sentence stated that "when we seek to be absolved of our sins, we must first admit
our sins, and in this case there has been no admission of sins." Id. Remarking on the
defendants' choice to stand trial, which they had a constitutional right to do, and on their
inability to assert a defense, the judge did not show leniency toward the defendants. Id.
The Court of Appeals remanded this case to determine the motivating factors behind the
sentencing because the "tenor of the court's observation [was] not entirely clear." Id.
138. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d at 197. The court further required each defendant to admit
that he had the intent to commit the crime. Id. The defendants had raised the defense of
entrapment and argued that accepting responsibility for intent to commit the crime would
jeopardize their chances for successful appeal. See id. at 196.
139. See id. at 197.
140. Id. at 197-98. The court stated that, "[i]f the defendant has exercised all of his
rights during the entire process, including sentencing, then the chances of his receiving the
two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility may well be diminished." Id. at 197.
Section 3E1.1 does not allow the judge to weigh against the defendant the defendant's
exercise of constitutional or statutory rights. However, the court concluded that "[tihe
exercise of these rights may diminish the defendant's chances of being granted the two
level reduction, not because it is weighed against him but because it is likely that there is
less evidence of acceptance to weigh in his favor." Id.
141. Id.
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Under United States v. Saunders,142 a defendant who stands trial gener-
ally is not eligible for the acceptance of responsibility reduction. 43 The
Saunders case challenged the constitutionality of 3E1.1 based on the dis-
advantages it creates for a defendant who confesses after trial.'" Ac-
cording to the Saunders decision, definitively prohibiting a sentence
reduction solely because a defendant stands trial would be unconstitu-
tional.145 Alternatively, a defendant who demonstrates sincere remorse
at trial may be able to obtain an acceptance of responsibility reduction.' 46
The Saunders court recognized that a defendant will have difficulty con-
vincing a trial judge that he has accepted responsibility if he has main-
tained his innocence throughout the trial and has not cooperated with the
authorities.' 47 But the court decided that this difficulty alone did not
render section 3E1.1 unconstitutional.
48
Further, a defendant who pleads guilty is not guaranteed the two-level
reduction.'49 In United States v. Gonzalez, ' the court characterized a
3E1.1 reduction as a possible benefit for a qualified defendant.' 51 The
mere possibility of leniency does not preclude a judge from denying leni-
ent treatment where the defendant fails to show contrition. 5 2 In this in-
stance, the judge's denial of the reduction was based on the defendant's
conduct at trial, not on his decision to stand trial.'53 Therefore, the appel-
late court found that the application of 3E1.1 did not violate the defend-
ant's constitutional rights.'
54
142. 973 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1026 (1993). Saunders was
convicted of "conspiring to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute and of possessing
cocaine with the intent to distribute." Id. at 1356.
143. Id. at 1361-63.
144. Id. at 1362-63.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1363 (stating that although a defendant going to trial may be prohibited from
receiving the acceptance of responsibility reduction, the reduction could be available under
unusual circumstances upon a showing of extreme remorse).
147. Id.
148. Id. The trial court was unimpressed with Saunders' expression of remorse, stating
that it was "too little, too late" to warrant an Acceptance of Responsibility reduction. Id.
at 1364.
149. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1990).
150. Id. at 1018.
151. Id. at 1021.
152. Id. Gonzalez argued that his contrition was demonstrated by his "appearing for
sentencing, accepting the judgment of the jury and the sentence of the judge, and serving
his time." Id. at 1020.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1021.
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D. Judicial Economy Considerations
1. Retaliatory Sentences for Wasting the Court's Time Are
Impermissible
Although the Commission emphasized the importance of judicial econ-
omy in the construction of the Sentencing Guidelines, courts have struck
down retaliatory sentences which were imposed for frivolously consum-
ing the court's time. 5' In United States v. Hutchings,156 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit required the resentencing of a
defendant who was penalized for wasting public funds and resources.
157
The trial judge stated during sentencing that the absence of a defense
rendered the trial superfluous. 158 Because the judge sentenced the de-
fendant to the maximum possible sentence and maximum fines, without
explanation other than the reference to wasting the court's time and pub-
lic funds, the appellate court remanded the case for resentencing. 159
Another retaliatory issue arises when a co-defendant enters a guilty
plea and receives a lesser sentence than the defendant who chose to stand
trial. In United States v. Mazzaferro,16 ° the trial judge imposed concur-
rent twenty-year sentences for three drug-related counts against Maz-
zaferro, who did not plead guilty, while imposing upon his co-defendants,
who plead guilty, one ten-year sentence for the same offenses. 161 This
disparity is particularly alarming in light of the minor role that Maz-
zaferro played in the perpetration of the crime, as compared to his co-
defendants. 61 The appellate court noted a strong inference that Maz-
155. See United States v. Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 1989) (remanding a
sentence which appeared retaliatory); United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 14 (2nd
Cir.) (remanding a sentence where the record was unclear whether the trial judge consid-
ered the defendant's decision to stand trial in determining his sentence), cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1031 (1985).
156. 757 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031 (1985).
157. 757 F.2d at 13. The trial judge stated that the trial had been a "total waste of
public funds and resources" since the defendant did not provide any defense to his case.
Id. at 14. Furthermore, the trial judge wanted to consider the expenditure of public funds
at sentencing but also sought to tax the defendant for the costs associated with his prosecu-
tion. Id. at 13-14.
158. Id. at 13.
159. Id. at 14; see also United States v. Crocker, 788 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1986). A judge's
remarks concerning defendants who exercise their constitutional right to stand trial could
be a factor in determining the length of sentence imposed in cases where defendants pres-
ent a frivolous case "sufficient to establish that there was a reasonable likelihood of vindic-
tiveness in the imposition of a harsher sentence." Id. at 809.
160. 865 F.2d 450 (1st Cir. 1989), later proceeding, 907 F.2d 251 (1990).
161. 865 F.2d at 457.
162. Id. The defendants in this case were arrested by the United States Coast Guard
for three drug related charges involving possession with intent to distribute 3,468 pounds of
marijuana. Id. at 451-52. The testimony at trial, however, showed Mazzaferro's responsi-
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zaferro's sentence was motivated by retaliation for not entering a guilty
plea and remanded the case for resentencing. The appellate court noted
that one of the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines is to reduce the
disparity in sentencing between defendants who commit similar crimes.'
63
2. Judicial Economy Arguments for Encouraging Guilty Pleas
Even if section 3E1.1 burdens the defendant who chooses to go trial,
there is authority holding that such a burden is constitutional.164 The
Supreme Court has held that plea bargaining is justified by the state's
interest in conserving prosecutorial and judicial resources. 65 In Brady v.
United States, 66 for example, the Supreme Court identified the preserva-
tion of prosecutorial and judicial resources as legitimate state interests in
upholding the constitutional validity of a sentencing scheme that favored
guilty pleas.167
In addition to the encouragement of judicial and law enforcement
economy, courts have justified the Acceptance of Responsibility provi-
sion on the strong societal interests it serves. 168 These interests include
"the reduction of crime, restitution, early withdrawal from criminal activ-
bilities were limited to assisting in the sailing of the boat and not to executing the drug
transactions. Id. at 453. Mazzaferro was found guilty and sentenced to twenty years im-
prisonment and fined $25,000. Id. The other defendants, who plead guilty and played a
more substantial role in the execution of the illegal transactions, were each sentenced to
ten years imprisonment and five years supervised release. Id.; see also United States v.
Capriola, 537 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1976). The Capriola court stated that when some defend-
ants plead guilty and others do not, and "there is substantial disparity in sentences imposed
upon different individuals for engaging in the same criminal activity, the preservation of
the appearance of judicial integrity and impartiality requires that the sentencing judge rec-
ord an explanation." Id. at 321.
163. Mazzaferro, 865 F.2d at 460.
164. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (upholding the validity
of extending a benefit to a defendant who demonstrates that he accepts responsibility for
his crime by entering a guilty plea), later proceeding, 433 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1497 (D. Or. 1988) (rejecting argument that § 3E1.1 is
unconstitutional on its face), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.), and
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 860 (1990).
165. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 223 (1978) (stating that the plea bargain-
ing system is designed to be mutually beneficial to the defendant and the state); Brady, 397
U.S. at 749, 752 (1970) (finding the defendant's voluntary guilty plea valid, and choosing to
limit his punishment to life imprisonment as opposed to the possibility of the death penalty
had he been convicted by a jury); United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 934 (D.C. Cir.)
(relying on the Brady and Bordenkircher decisions to find a legitimate interest in preserv-
ing prosecutorial and judicial resources) vacated in part, reh'g granted, en banc, 980 F.2d
746 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and adhered to, on reh'g, en banc, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and
cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 741 (1994).
166. 397 U.S. 742 (1970), later proceeding, 433 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970).
167. 397 U.S. at 752.
168. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. at 1497.
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ity, withdrawal of criminals from positions of trust and responsibility, and
the increased potential for rehabilitation among those who feel and show
true remorse for their anti-social conduct."' 6 9 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in United States v. Henry'70 that a
state may extend a benefit to a defendant "who demonstrates by his plea
that he is ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correc-
tional system in a frame of mind that affords hope for the success of reha-
bilitation over a shorter period of time than might otherwise be
necessary.' 171 The Henry court did not hold the Acceptance of Respon-
sibility provision unconstitutional because such holding would recognize
that "defendants who express genuine remorse for their actions can never
be rewarded at sentencing. "172
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DENYING A DEFENDANT A BENEFIT
AND PENALIZING HIM
The most difficult issue to address when considering the proposed and
current section 3E1.1 reductions, is whether there is a difference between
providing a reduction to a defendant for entering a guilty plea and penal-
izing a defendant for standing trial.'7 3 One line of authority suggests that
3E1.1 does not impose a penalty on the defendant, but instead provides a
possible reduction in his sentence.' 74 This rationale serves as the founda-
tion for judicial approval of plea bargaining arrangements as a valid
method for encouraging guilty pleas. 75 Cases such as Corbitt and
Bordenkircher encouraged legislation providing for adequate incentives
for an Acceptance of Responsibility reduction prior to the promulgation
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'76
In Jones, for instance, the court demonstrated the vast discretion a trial
judge permissibly can exercise regarding the effect a defendant's decision
169. Id. (recognizing that the list is not exhaustive); see also United States v. Gonzalez,
897 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting the Belgard decision).
170. 883 F.2d 1010 (11th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 1010 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 753).
172. Id.
173. See Dokla, supra note 45, at 1094-97 (discussing the tension between § 3El.1 and
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
174. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (presenting argument that § 3E1.1 is
not a penalty).
175. See United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018,1021 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that
"[t]he pursuit . . . of a trial strategy of denying culpability may lower [a defendant's]
chances of obtaining the reduction under section 3E1.1 but these consequences do not
constitute an infringement of the fifth amendment [sic]").
176. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978).
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to stand trial has on his sentence length.'77 The Jones decision also illus-
trates how the Federal Sentencing Guidelines allow a trial judge to weigh
factors, including the defendant's decision to plead guilty, when deciding
on an equitable sentence. 78
The Corbitt decision provides further support for the philosophy of dif-
ferentiating between encouraging a defendant to enter a guilty plea and
penalizing a defendant for standing trial by holding that the legislatures
can statutorily encourage a defendant to enter a guilty plea by affording
different sentencing options when the defendant decides to plead
guilty.1 79 Bordenkircher also supports the aforementioned proposition by
upholding sentencing differentials that are based on a defendant's free-
dom to choose between entering a plea or putting the government to its
burden of proof. 8 '
These cases suggest that differing risks and consequences among a de-
fendant's available defense alternatives are insufficient grounds for as-
signing constitutional error.' 81  These cases provide the necessary
foundation to support an automatic sentence reduction for a guilty plea
by distinguishing between increasing the severity of a sentence for failure
to demonstrate remorse and refusing to reduce a sentence from the pre-
scribed base-level offense for a defendant's refusal to accept
responsibility."8
In contrast, the argument that the Acceptance of Responsibility provi-
sion impedes a defendant's right to stand trial parallels the issues arising
when a defendant successfully attacks his original conviction but receives
a harsher sentence upon reconviction. 18 3 It is an established principle
177. United States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 928, 937-38 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that a judge may
weigh a defendant's refusal to plead guilty as evidence that he will not accept responsibility
thus affecting a defendant's sentence), vacated in part, reh'g granted, en banc, 980 F,2d 746
(D.C. Cir. 1992), adhered to, on reh'g, en banc, 991 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and cert.
denied, United States v. Jones, 114 S. Ct. 741 (1994).
178. Id. at 932-33. Here, the trial judge acknowledged that Jones should receive a por-
tion of the acceptance of responsibility reduction, but not the entire two level reduction.
Id.
179. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Corbitt decision).
180. See supra notes 95-103 (discussing the Bordenkircher decision).
181. See Jones, 973 F.2d at 938 (recognizing that the defendant must have some incen-
tive to plead guilty and is afforded the opportunity to take advantage of the incentive by
entering a guilty plea).
182. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. at 212, 219 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. at 357, 365 (1978); See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). A plea may
provide the defendant with "the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty [than that] ...
authorized by law for the crime charged." Id. at 751.
183. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,722-25 (1969) (holding that the imposi-
tion of a longer sentence after a resentencing must be supported by evidence clearly dem-
onstrating that the new sentence is not vindictive).
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that a court must not penalize a defendant for engaging in constitution-
ally protected conduct. 184 Opponents of the Acceptance of Responsibil-
ity provision equate the denial of the benefit derived under this provision
with the imposition of a penalty for the exercise of a constitutional right.
These critics maintain that the Acceptance of Responsibility provision
should be available even to defendants who exercise their constitutional
right to stand trial. 185 Case law consistent with this view supports the
notion that an automatic reduction which is available only to the defend-
ant foregoing a trial is an unconstitutional burden on the defendant's
right to a trial. 186 Most of these cases, however, were decided prior to the
promulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and before plea bar-
gaining became such an accepted practice.
187
If, as these cases suggest, defendants fear the possibility of a greater
sentence if they choose to go to trial, the number of defendants opting to
enter a guilty plea under the Sentencing Guidelines should logically in-
crease. Surprisingly, however, since the enactment of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, the number of defendants pleading guilty has
decreased, 88 even though the incentive to plead guilty supposedly has
increased. 89
184. E.g., United States v. Watt, 910 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that constitu-
tionally protected conduct may not factor into the court's sentencing determination);
United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that the gov-
ernment cannot penalize a person because he exercises his Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate himself).
185. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724 (stating that penalizing a defendant for exercising a
constitutional right is patently unconstitutional); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968); Watt, 910 F.2d at 587; Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 455.
186. Cf Pearce, 395 U.S. at 711; Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570; Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 455.
187. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 711 (decided in 1969); Jackson, 390 U.S. at 570 (decided in
1968); Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d at 455 (decided in 1989).
188. See Heaney, supra note 2, at 175-76, 184. Sentencing trends in four districts were
analyzed under both pre-guideline practices and post-guideline practices. The study con-
cluded that the number of defendants pleading guilty diminished, and the number of trials
under the guidelines increased by one-third in the selected districts. See id. at 175-84.
Percentage of Guidelines Percentage of Pre-
Defendants Pleading Guideline Defendants
Guilty in 1989 Pleading Guilty in 1989
All Selected Districts 79% 86%
Dist. No. 1 80% 84%
Dist. No. 2 78% 94%
Dist. No. 3 87% 94%
Dist. No. 4 73% 76%
Id. at 176.
189. See id. at 175-84 (discussing sentencing data to determine the effects of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on the sentencing pro-
cess). A defendant who receives the two-level Acceptance of Responsibility reduction gets
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A final line of cases state that the severity of a defendant's sentence
cannot be based solely on his decision to stand trial.'9 ° However, these
cases add that as long as the defendant has an opportunity to prove he
has accepted responsibility, even if it is practically impossible for him to
do so after maintaining his innocence at trial, the Guidelines are constitu-
tional.' In light of these cases, an automatic Acceptance of Responsi-
bility reduction for those pleading guilty is supportable, but only if other
reductions are made available to defendants going to trial, such as some
of those provided under subsection (a) of 3E1.1.192
III. PROPOSAL TO CHANGE THE ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
PROVISION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO
PROVIDE FOR AN AUTOMATIC REDUCTION
Section 3E1.1 should be redrafted to include an automatic reduction in
a defendant's sentence in exchange for entering a pre-trial guilty plea.'
93
This reduction should be denied to a defendant who chooses to exercise
his right to stand trial because he obtains the benefit of putting the gov-
a reduction of 20% to 30% in his sentence. Id. at 179. As the following table demonstrates
clearly, the possibility of receiving an Acceptance of Responsibility reduction is substan-
tially greater if one enters a guilty plea.
Percentage of Offenders Receiving Acceptance of Responsibility in 1989
District % of Total Guilty Pleas % of Total Trials
All Selected Districts 77% 16%
Dist. No. 1 83% 17%
Dist. No. 2 86% 24%
Dist. No. 3 78% 33%
Dist. No. 4 54% 2%
Id. at 180.
190. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text (discussing the Rodriquez deci-
sion); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1026
(1993).
191. See United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 649
(1992); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1026 (1993); United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1990).
192. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1 application note at 248. The application note 1
lists other appropriate considerations as:
voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations; vol-
untary payment of restitution prior to adjudication of guilty; voluntary surrender
to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense;
voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of
the offense; post-offense rehabilitative efforts (e.g., counseling or drug treatment).
Id.
193. Contra, U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3El.1, at 249 application note 3 (stating that
"[a] defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section
as a matter of right.").
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ernment to its burden of proof and the opportunity to rebut the govern-
ment's case. However, an exception from the latter should exist for a
defendant who stands trial to challenge the constitutionality of a statute
or its application, even though he does not deny the factual criminal con-
duct of the charges. 194 This proposal would not permit a judge to impose
a sentence longer than the base-level sentencing guideline range because
a defendant decides to stand trial, but would require a court to deny an
Acceptance of Responsibility reduction to a defendant who simply dem-
onstrates remorse after being found guilty.
195
This adjustment can be accomplished by delinking subsections (a) and
(b) of section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.196 The sec-
tions should be rewritten to allow the defendant entering a guilty plea to
receive an automatic reduction of two levels under subsection (b). Then,
subsection (a) should provide a one-level reduction if any defendant has
demonstrated acceptance of responsibility outside of entering a guilty
plea. Thus, a defendant who enters a guilty plea and a defendant choos-
ing to stand trial would both receive a one-level reduction if they demon-
strate, to the satisfaction of the sentencing judge, the applicable factors
currently promulgated in the Acceptance of Responsibility provision
outside of entering a guilty plea.
197
IV. WEIGHING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PLEA BARGAINING, AND
JUDICIAL ECONOMY
To decide whether the proposed change to section 3E1.1 better fulfills
the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines and the philosophies of pun-
194. See id. application note 2. The Sentencing Commission established that:
Conviction by trial ... does not automatically preclude a defendant from consid-
eration for such a reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly demon-
strate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he
exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a
defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual
guilt.
Id.
195. The proposal relies on the distinction between denying a benefit and penalizing a
defendant as demonstrated in § I part A of this Comment. Other sentencing proposals
recommend taking the sentence reduction away from the judge's discretion. STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE SENTENCING, supra note 8, § 18-3.8, at 77. One proposal recom-
mends that the consideration of guilty pleas should not be left to the discretion of individ-
ual sentencing judges. Id. at 79. Furthermore, this proposal recommends that defendants
exercising their right to stand trial can accept responsibility and should not be penalized.
Id. However, the proposal acknowledges that courts should be suspicious of acceptance of
responsibility claims that follow a full adjudication of guilt. Id.
196. For the text of subsections (a) and (b), see supra note 24.
197. See infra note 194 (listing reductions that are available to a defendant who does
not enter a guilty plea).
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ishment without compromising a defendant's constitutional rights, each
item will be discussed under the terms of the proposed amendment.
A. Purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines
The purposes of the Guidelines are to promote honesty, uniformity,
and proportionality in sentencing. 198 The proposal to delink subsection
(a) and (b) accomplishes all three goals. The foundation of the sentenc-
ing guidelines is the reduction of unwarranted sentencing disparity.
1 99
An automatic reduction presumption would allow a judge to acknowl-
edge the entry of a guilty plea while reserving the judicial right to depart
from the guideline reduction for unusual or extreme cases.200 The two-
level reduction provides a proportional reduction based on where, under
the guideline range, the defendant's charged conduct places him in the
sentencing table.20 1 This reduction, therefore, allows a uniform reduction
that is tailored to the individuals sentencing range.
The Commission promulgated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to es-
tablish a more uniform sentencing structure.20 2 To reduce arbitrary sen-
tencing, the guidelines limit, but do not totally remove, a judge's
discretion in sentencing each individual defendant.20 3 By providing an
automatic two-level reduction for a guilty plea, the proposed delinkage of
subsections (a) and (b) of section 3E1.1 would create a bright-line rule,
thereby simplifying the sentencing process, but still allow the judge to
consider individual characteristics of each defendant in determining two
things; the appropriate sentence within a guideline range, and the appli-
cability of the one-level Acceptance of Responsibility reduction for ac-
ceptance of responsibility conduct outside of entering a guilty plea.
198. See CAMPBELL, supra note 14, at 92.
199. Id. at 90; supra note 12 and accompanying text (identifying uniformity as a goal of
the Guidelines).
200. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), a sentence may be increased or decreased if the court
finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances that are not adequately considered by the
guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). A sentencing judge could also use the guideline
provision for sentence enhancements or departures to in effect deny a defendant a substan-
tive reduction. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 5K2.0, at 307 (providing an opportunity for the
sentencing judge to depart from the recommended sentencing range if he finds that there
are aggravating or mitigating circumstances not adequately considered by the guidelines).
201. A two-level reduction typically provides a 25 percent decrease in the sentence.
Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 38, at 267.
202. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.
203. See CAMPBELL, supra note 14, § 4.8, at 88.
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B. Furthering the Philosophies of Punishment
The United States Sentencing Commission recognizes incapacitation,
retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence as the purposes of criminal
punishment." ° All of these purposes can be served better by the pro-
posed change to section 3E1.1. When a defendant is enticed to enter a
guilty plea, efficient and certain punishment is ensured.2"' The rehabilita-
tive goals of punishment are better served if a defendant affirmatively
recognizes his criminal behavior. This is true because after recognizing
his wrongdoing, the defendant may be more receptive to rehabilitation
programs. °6 Another justification for rewarding a defendant who ac-
cepts responsibility include judges' beliefs that acknowledgment of guilt
and responsibility correlate to a lower probability of recidivism.20 7 As
early as 1959, judges acknowledged that a defendant who takes steps to-
ward rehabilitation by pleading guilty should be treated differently than a
defendant who seeks every opportunity to avoid conviction.20 8 The
counterargument, that the rehabilitative purpose of section 3E1.1 is inef-
fective, is unsubstantiated. Rehabilitation was the country's leading sen-
tencing rationale until the late 1970's.209 When sentencing reform
debates arose in the late 70's and 80's, however, the consensus opinion
was that rehabilitative efforts generally failed.210 Some sentencing critics,
instead of concluding that rehabilitation was an ineffective rationale,
viewed an inadequate prison system as frustrating the purpose of the re-
habilitative philosophy.211 Therefore, the alleged failure of the rehabili-
tative philosophy should not negatively effect the purpose of rewarding
guilty pleas under section 3E1.1.
C. Societal Benefits of Plea Incentives
Society benefits when a defendant receives an incentive to enter a
guilty plea. The first such benefit is the judiciary's interest in promoting
204. Id. § 2.1 at 17; see, supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text (discussing these
purposes).
205. See U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3El.l, at 249-50 (stating that a defendant who en-
ters a guilty plea accepts responsibility in a manner that "ensures the certainty of his just
punishment in a timely manner").
206. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 17, at 204.
207. Id.
208. DAWSON, supra note 79, at 175; see id. at 175 n.9 (comparing defendants who plead
guilty and publicly acknowledging their guilt versus those exercising their constitutional
rights but never taking any steps toward rehabilitation).
209. CAMPBELL, supra note 14, at 29.
210. Id. at 32. Arguably, the lack of genuine rehabilitative efforts attempted in the
nation's correctional system was the cause of the aforementioned failure. Id.
211. Id. at 31.
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judicial economy.212 Other societal benefits include sparing the victims
of crime and their families from further disruption to their lives by avoid-
ing trial. Additionally, the public saves substantial resources in prosecut-
ing fewer defendants.2 13 Perhaps most importantly, the offender, upon
entering a guilty plea, is quickly removed from society, eliminating the
possibility of immediate future criminal activity. 14
D. Providing for a More Honest Plea Bargaining System
Critics of sentence reductions argue that plea agreements are sufficient
to reward a defendant for entering a guilty plea.2 15 Approximately ninety
percent of all federal criminal cases involve guilty pleas, and many in-
volve some form of plea agreement.216 The most common form of plea
agreement consists of dismissing a count in exchange for a defendant's
guilty plea to other counts.27 This "charged offense" system directly af-
fects the sentence level for a defendant according to his charged conduct
as opposed to his actual conduct.2 18 A second form of plea agreement
under the Guidelines is sentence bargaining.219 The effect of this form of
agreement is dependant on the judge's reaction to a requested departure
212. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (discussing the benefits of
conserving scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources when a defendant enters a guilty
plea) later proceeding, 433 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Wiley, 184 F.
Supp. 679, 684-85 (N.D. I11. 1960) (promoting leniency for guilty pleas as an administrative
necessity); DAWSON, supra note 79, at 175 (noting the necessity of rewarding guilty pleas
for courts to handle their case load); Most judges agree that "'since the defendant has
saved the government the time and expense of trial, the sentence is less than it ordinarily
would be.'" Wiley, 184 F. Supp. at 684. The operation of a criminal court depends on
inducing a large number of actually guilty defendants to plead guilty in exchange for leni-
ency. Id. at 685.
213. See supra note 212.
214. See U.S.S.G., supra note 10, at 249-50 (acknowledging that a defendant who enters
a guilty plea will be ensured certain, just, and timely punishment).
215. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 38, at 238 (discussing prosecutorial discretion
in charging and plea negotiations as a modern practice that greatly impacts a defendant's
ultimate sentence).
216. U.S.S.G., supra note 10, at 6.
217. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 38, at 262-64 (discussing charge bargaining,
guideline factor bargaining, and date bargaining); Ryan-Boyle, supra note 12, at 747 (rec-
ognizing that the guidelines are primarily a "charge offense" rather than "real offense"
system).
218. Ryan-Boyle, supra note 12, at 747; see also Nicole L. Felton, Update, White Collar
Crime: Survey of Law, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 359, 531-32 (1988) (differentiating a charged
offense system from a real offense system).
219. CRIMINAL DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE PROSECUTORS HAND-
BOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING RE-
FORM ACT OF 1984, (1987) [hereinafter PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK] at 41. Sentence
bargaining under the Sentencing Guidelines is limited to the prosecutor's recommendation
that a defendant receive a reduction or a departure. Id.
1300
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from the sentencing guidelines after a defendant has been convicted or
has entered a guilty plea.22 °
Under the charge bargaining system, the body of a presentence report
is written to reflect the offense of conviction agreed upon between the
prosecutor and the defendant, not the actual offense charged. 221 The de-
cision the prosecutor makes at the charging stage can greatly affect the
sentence a defendant receives regardless of the defendant's decision to
enter a guilty plea.222 By agreeing on the charged conviction, a defendant
can determine the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.223
The impact of the plea agreement is to be documented in the presentence
report thereby enabling the judge to compare the proposed sentence to
the sentence for all charged conduct.224 In effect, this charged offense
bargaining system shifts power from the judge to those who are involved
in the preparation of the presentence report, the prosecutor and the pro-
bation officer .225
Such prosecutorial discretion should be limited to avoid the creation of
a new sentencing disparity involving plea and charge bargaining prac-
tices. 2 2 1 By allowing the plea bargaining process to be open completely
220. See id.
221. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, PROBATION DIVISION,
Presentence Investigation Reports Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, reprinted in
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, at 379; see Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 38,
at 264 (discussing the prosecutor's ability to decide on an appropriate sentence and then
prepare the charging documents appropriately instead of basing the presentencing report
on actual criminal conduct).
This process is supposed to be governed by the Prosecutor's Handbook on Sentencing
Guidelines which explains the procedures for prosecutors to follow when entering various
plea bargaining negotiations. PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK, supra note 219, at 33-50.
222. PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK, supra note 219, at 33. The prosecutor is to determine
which factors are important to the sentencing decision when preparing the charging docu-
ments and prepare the documents accordingly. Id.
223. Id. at 440.
224. Id. at 394. But see Heaney, supra note 2, at 187-88 (illustrating that a statutorily
mandated minimum sentence, within the current sentencing system, promotes plea bar-
gains that are designed to conceal important sentencing factors and avoid the mandatory
minimum sentence).
225. Heaney, supra note 2, at 163, 166 (criticizing the sentencing system for limiting
judicial discretion and requiring judges to spend more time on sentencing issues; and rec-
ommending that judges be authorized to impose sentences less than that mandated by the
guidelines without a motion from the prosecutor).
226. Id. at 194 (recognizing a "new breed" of sentencing disparity hidden from the
records and dependant on a particular prosecutor's caseload and jurisdiction); see also
Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 771, 774 (1992) (recognizing "that disparity will occur anytime the system requires
exercises of discretion" and that under the federal criminal justice system this discretion is
exercised "long before a district court imposes a sentence"); Schulhofer, supra note 17, at
842. The author argues that the current system allows prosecutors and defense attorneys
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to prosecutorial discretion, the effectiveness of the Guidelines in reducing
sentence disparity is greatly diminished.227 Since the charge of conviction
is the most significant factor in determining a defendant's sentence, pros-
ecutor's decisions to drop charges ultimately could undermine the pur-
pose of the guideline system.
228
Plea bargaining power, however, also is available through prosecutorial
recommendation for a specific penalty within the applicable sentencing
range under the sentence bargaining form of plea agreement.2 29 For ex-
ample, a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
will reduce a sentence by roughly twenty-five percent.230 Further, if the
prosecutor recommends that the defendant be sentenced at the low end
of the sentencing range, a thirty-five percent reduction from the charged
conduct may result.
231
The delinkage proposal promotes a greater degree of honesty in the
presentence report as well as uniformity in sentencing.232 Strict applica-
tion of the Sentencing Guidelines themselves would adequately en-
to manipulate the facts and charges to produce whatever sentence they want. Id. The
result is a shift of power from judges to attorneys and providing for disparity in the sen-
tencing process among prosecutors and districts. Id. In fact, evasion from the proper
Guideline sentence occurs in 20% to 35% of all cases. Id. at 845; Schulhofer & Nagel,
supra note 38, at 232 (discussing the potential adverse effects of allowing the sentencing
discretion to remain in prosecutorial hands, which if unchecked, could create disparities
that sentencing reform was intended to prevent); Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform
and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive"
Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 563-76 (1978) (discussing the detrimental effects of a
prosecutor's extensive power to bargain for guilty pleas).
To address the need to limit prosecutorial power, Congress required the Sentencing
Commission to promulgate "general policy statements regarding ... the appropriate use of
... the authority granted under rule 11 (e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant to rule 11(e)(1)." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(a)(2)(E) (1988). Under this provision, the Commission is "directed to issue policy
statements for consideration by Federal judges in deciding whether to accept a plea agree-
ment" in order to ensure that the prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to undermine
the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 10, at 63.
227. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggre-
gation, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) (describing an unrestrained plea bargaining
system as a "prosecutor's paradise"). But see Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 843 (recogniz-
ing that judges are becoming less dependant on probation officer and prosecutor recom-
mendations as they become more familiar with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
228. PROSECUTORS HANDBOOK, supra note 219, at 45.
229. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL - MEMORAN-
DUM, Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act, reprinted in FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 17 at 625.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 281 (recognizing guideline manipulation through charge bargaining as
restricting the effectiveness of the current sentencing guidelines, which encourage plea bar-
gaining, through inadequate incentives).
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courage a more honest presentence report for charged conduct, a more
reliable criminal history for possible future sentencing purposes, and the
preservation of judicial discretion. Direct application of the Sentencing
Guidelines will make sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act "fair,
honest, and appropriate." '233 By guaranteeing a defendant an automatic
reduction in his sentence, the prosecution will be less likely to bargain
over the criminal conduct charged on the presentencing report.234 This
provides for a more honest application of the Sentencing Guideline's of-
fense levels for categories of criminal conduct.235 Thereby, the defendant
will be charged with the crime he actually committed and still benefit
from pleading guilty.
236
E. Denying a Reduction Is Not Equivalent to Imposing a Penalty
The delinkage proposal encourages a defendant to plead guilty by en-
suring a reduction in the applicable sentencing guideline range. The pro-
posal also denies a reduction to a defendant who elects to stand trial.237
The proposal does not allow for vindictive sentencing as it has been ad-
233. See id. at 626 (calling for an "honest application of the guidelines").
234. A judge, if a defendant is guaranteed an automatic reduction in his sentence, will
be less likely to tolerate the manipulation of the factual criminal conduct to achieve a
sentencing range. See United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1222-23 (8th Cir.) (criticiz-
ing the current system for giving probation officers too much influence on sentencing
thereby resulting in a loss of judicial discretion), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990); see also
United States v. Roberts, 726 F. Supp. 1359, 1367-68 (D.D.C. 1989) (pointing out that the
current system typically gives a tremendous amount of control to young, inexperienced
prosecutors as opposed to a more experienced and seasoned judge), rev'd sub. nor,
United States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub. nom, United States v. Doe, 934
F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir.), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 896 (1991); Andrew von Hirsch, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367,
376-78 (1989) (suggesting that loose departure rules allowing for departures from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines undermines the effectiveness of the guidelines in maintaining a consis-
tent sentencing system).
235. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a judge had greater
discretion in levying a sentence. REPORT ON GUIDELINES SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 24.
However, under the Sentencing Guidelines, a prosecutor has great influence on the appli-
cable sentencing range through plea negotiations and charging practices. See id. (maintain-
ing that the charging and plea practices have a greater impact on the harshness of the
defendant's sentence). Therefore, practitioners are likely to limit available information to
contain sentencing exposure under the guideline system. Id. If this continues, such
prosecutorial conduct can undermine the purpose of the guidelines, the elimination of sen-
tencing disparity. Id. at 65.
236. With the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, most defendants ex-
pect to receive a 25% reduction. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 38, at 267. Under the
current system, it is difficult to determine the effect of a guilty plea on a defendant's sen-
tence because there is no record of the offenses dropped by the prosecutor. See Heaney,
supra note 2, at 190-91.
237. See Part III, supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text (proposing that the "ac-
ceptance of responsibility" reduction be denied to defendants choosing to stand trial).
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dressed by the courts. In Corbitt, for instance, the constitutionality of a
policy encouraging guilty pleas by reduced sentences turned on whether it
was endorsed by the legislature, rather than imposed through the judge's
initiative. 238 By providing a bright-line rule regarding sentence reduc-
tion, judges cannot be selectively vindictive. Therefore, there can be no
element of retaliation in denying the reduction.
The courts and the Commission both recognized that placing different
risks on the exercise of options in the judicial system is permissible. 239 A
defendant who chooses to exercise his right to testify runs the risk of
being subjected to perjury charges whereas the defendant who exercises
his right not to incriminate himself does not. Both are constitutional.
Simply because a judge tells a defendant, who has been convicted, that
he could have received a lower sentence if he had entered into a plea
agreement, it does not signify that the judge is penalizing the defendant
for standing trial.2 4 ° Furthermore, there is no difference between the
aforementioned situation and a situation where the sentencing judge in-
forms a defendant who plead guilty that the government could not have
met its burden of proof. As distasteful and inappropriate as this may be,
it is not unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has recognized and upheld statutory sentencing
schemes that permit judges to reduce sentences for a defendant who
pleads guilty.24 1 The proposed Acceptance of Responsibility provision
serves precisely the same purpose. The Supreme Court has upheld a stat-
ute that provides a mandatory life sentence for a defendant convicted of
first degree murder, but also elects not to enforce the same punishment
on a defendant who voluntarily enters a guilty plea, as a constitutional
238. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978); see United States v. Jones, 973
F.2d 928, 943 (D.C. Cir.) (Mikva, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (sug-
gesting that a legislature may statutorily encourage guilty pleas through offering substantial
benefits, but such offenses may not be extended by a judge without explicit statutory au-
thorization), vacated, in part, reh'g granted, en banc, 980 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1992), adhered
to on reh'g, en banc, 997 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 741 (1992).
239. See generally Jones, 973 F.2d at 943 (discussing the impact on sentencing of failure
to choose in a plea bargaining situation); U.S.S.G., supra note 10, § 3E1.1, at 249 applica-
tion note 2 (explaining that the reduction is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts
the government to its burden of proof and is found guilty and denies the essential factual
elements of his guilt); see also id. at application note 6 (explaining that to qualify under
subsection (b)(2), the defendant must notify the authorities of his intention to plead guilty
early enough in the trial process to allow the government to avoid wasting scarce judicial
and prosecutorial resources and to allow for the efficient scheduling of the court calendar).
240. See supra notes 91-131 and accompanying text (discussing opinions that there is no
constitutional error in rewarding a guilty plea).
241. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978) (reiterating prior holdings that




method of enticing defendants to enter guilty pleas.24 2 The Court in Cor-
bitt concluded that a defendant convicted at trial is not penalized for de-
manding a jury trial any more than a defendant who plead guilty is
penalized for forfeiting a chance of acquittal.243 The Court should uphold
the constitutionality of an automatic sentence reduction in exchange for a
guilty plea on the same basis.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposal for an automatic acceptance of responsibility sentence
reduction in exchange for a guilty plea includes all of the incentives of the
current section 3E1.1. Further, it promotes a more honest sentencing sys-
tem, that better fulfills the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. The
criminal justice system is better served by a bright-line rule that reduces
ambiguities in the sentencing process. Therefore, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission should adopt this proposal and amend the current
Acceptance of Responsibility provision appropriately.
Ellen M. Bryant
242. Id.
243. Id.
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